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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant appeals the magistrate's Decree of Divorce, entered on August 19, 2011, with
regard to the award of custody and visitation of the parties' minor children. The August 19,
2011 Decree of Divorce awarded, subsequent to a three-day trial, the submission of final
argument by both parties, and pursuant to the magistrate's July 28, 2011 Memorandum
Decision (including Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law) the following: joint legal and
joint physical custody of the minor children to the parties, with primary physical custody in
Respondent and secondary physical custody in Appellant as they (1) agree, or (2) in the
alternative, alternate weekends, alternate holidays (as defined in the Decree of Divorce),
and one-half summer each year. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 403-412).
A.

FACTUAL EVENTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties were married in Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 27, 1993. (R., Vol. 1,
p. 1). The parties have five children, namely E.M., born
T.T., bom

and twins, G.A.. and

J.K.,

W.R., born
bom

(R.,

Vol. 1, p.l).
During the marriage, the family relocated: They lived in South Carolina (1995-1998),
then Provo, Utah (1998-1999), then Shelley, Idaho (1999-2004), and finally Rigby, Idaho
(2004-present). (R., Vol. 2, p. 388).
The parties experienced marital difficulties during the marriage. An action for
divorce was filed in 2002. (Tr., p. 380, 11. 12-14; Tr., p. 50., 11. 24-25). During the pendency of
the 2002 divorce action, the parties exchanged the children for visitation in Malad, Idaho,
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when Appellant was in Idaho and Respondent was in Utah. (Tr., p. 499,

n. 10-13); (R., VoL,

2, p. 389).
The parties reconciled in 2003, the divorce action was dismissed, and the parties had
their three youngest children between 2005 and 2007. (R., Vol. 1, p. 2).
On or about June 28, 2009, Appellant was arrested for Indecent Exposure and Public
Nuisance.

(R., Vol. 1, p. 74-75).

Appellant was the sole wage earner for the family,

including at the time of his arrest. (Tr., p. 44, 11. 1-4).

Respondent was a stay-at-home

mother during the marriage. (Tr., p. 58, 11. 13-17). As a result of Appellant's arrest, he
resigned from his employment. (Tr., p. 134, n. 8-17).
The present divorce action was filed by Appellant on or about August 6, 2009, in
Bonneville County, Idaho. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 1-6).

Regarding his prayer for custody of the

parties' children, Appellant requested the following relief:

"Plaintiff requests that both

parents have joint legal and physical custody of the minor children."

(R., Vol. 1, p. 2).

Venue was transferred to Jefferson County, Idaho, the county of Respondent's residence, on
August 17, 2009 (R., Vol. 1, pp. 49-50). On February 2, 2010, the magistrate heard various
Motions, inter alia, Respondent's Motion for Custody Evaluation,

A Motion for

Continuance of Trial and Return of Children, and Objections to various Motions. (R., Vol. 1,
p. 175).

On February 19, 2010 and March 5, 2010, the court heard argument and testimony

encompassing Respondent's Motion for Temporary Orders.

(R., Vol. 1, pp. 201-203).

Pursuant to said hearing, the magistrate entered temporary custody orders: joint legal and
joint physical custody of the minor children to the parties, with primary physical custody in
Respondent and parenting time in Appellant consisting of two evenings per week and
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alternate weekends from Friday through Sunday. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 201-202). The magistrate
further awarded Respondent the exclusive possession of the marital residence during the
pendency of the divorce, and ordered Appellant to vacate the home and reside in a threebedroom apartment to be paid for by Respondent's brother. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 201-202).
Appellant instead moved into an RV, which he parked adjacent to the marital residence. (R.,
Vol. 2, p. 387).
The trial in the instant matter encompassed three days: March 2, 2011 (R., Vol. 2, pp.
287- 291), March 31,2011 (R., Vol. 2, pp. 298-308), and June 13, 2011 (R., Vol. 2, pp. 332-335).
Counsel for both parties submitted written argument subsequent to trial. (R., Vol. 2, pp.
337-354; pp. 355-378). The Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on August 19, 2011,
(R., Vol. 2., pp. 403-411), pursuant to the magistrate's July 28 2011 Memorandum Decision
(R., Vol. 2, pp. 379-401).
1.

Portions of Appellant's Recited "Procedural History" Were Decided in Earlier

Court Proceedings and are Moot to the Present Appeal.
Appellant's Brief, p. 7, contains several allegations related to service of the Complaint
and Summons upon Respondent, as well as unfounded statement(s) alleging Respondent's
"intentions."

Appellant claims that the magistrate did not take this information into

account when conducting its findings.

Respondent respect..fu!Iy submits the issues

surrounding the Writ of Assistance, Ex Parte Order, and accompanying pleadings were
encompassed in and resolved by the magistrate court during a contempt issue that was
heard and dismissed by the court in a 2010 proceeding in this matter.
encompassing the instant appeal reflects the prior resolution of these issues:
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The record

Q: All right. The Complaint in this matter the record will show was filed on
August 7tt. of 2009. You obviously are the Plaintiff. Russ, can you tell the
Court the basis or the reason for your filing initially for divorce that we're
Here on trial for today?
Yes. On August 6th Laura had told me that she was moving to Utah
with the children the very next day. My filing for divorce was as a last
recourse to prevent that from happening.
MS. SHEETS: Your Honor, we'd object to any line of that questioning
regarding that proposed move or any contempt action thereon. The contempt
motion's been dismissed by the Court in an earlier order. We think it's not
relevant. (fr., p. 47, 11. 22-25; p. 48, 11. 1-11).
A.;

THE COURT: I'll allow it, but I will not allow it as it might pertain to any
contempt issue. I think that's behind us and over with.
MR. CASTLETON: And I withdrew that for the record, so I will
comply with that order, Your Honor, and I don't intend to revisit that
again. (fr., p. 48, 11. 20-25).
Respondent thus respectfully states that including any references to the Issues
outlined in paragraph A.1 herein are not part of the present appeal.
2. Appellant's Post-Decree Affidavits are not Properly Part of the Present Appeal.
Respondent respectfully submits that Appellant's various affidavits filed after the
entry of the Decree of Divorce, including, but not limited to,

his affidavit filed in

conjunction with his Motion for Permissive Appeal to this Court, contain hearsay and
unsubstantiated allegations and are not part of the record to be considered by t..Ills Court for
purposes of the pending AppeaL
II. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully asserts and requests she is entided to attorneys fees on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, 32-704, and 32-705; pursuant to Idaho
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Appellate Rules Rule 40 and Rule 41; Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54, as well as any
and all other applicable statutes and Rules.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

LEGAL STANDARD.

1.

The Standard of Review in the Present Matter is an "Abuse of Discretion"

Standard.

As stated supra, this is a permissive appeal to this Court, as allowed by Rule 12.1 of
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Case law is instructive on the appropriate standard of review in
the present matter:
This case is on Direct permissive appeal from a decision of a magistrate
affecting the custody of minor children; therefore, this Court is directly
reviewing the magistrate's decision without the benefit of a district
court appellate decision. In custody disputes, the awarding of custody
of minor children rests within the discretion of the trial court whose
decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. (Roberts v.
Roberts, 138 Idaho 401,403, 64 P.3d 327 (Idaho 2003), citing Koester v.
Koester, 99 Idaho 654, 657, 586 P.2d 1370,1373 (1978); See also (Hopper v.
Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.3d 761, 763 (Idaho 2007».
2.

The "Abuse of Discretion" Standard is a Three-Part Test.

If the magistrate's decision meets the following three criteria, there is no abuse of

discretion:
In general, a trial court does not abuse this discretion so long as it
recognizes the issue as one of discretion; acts within the outer limits
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable
to the available choices; and reaches its decision through an exercise
of reason. (It!).
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3.

Disputed Evidence Does not Effect the Integrity of the Magistrate's Findings.

A reviewing Court will not disturb the magistrate's findings of fact even if evidence
is in dispute; said disputed evidence is seen in light of the judgment entered:
It is the province of the trier of fact to weigh conflicting

evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of
witnesses. The trial court's findings of fact in a court tried
case will be upheld if they are supported by substantial and
competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting and
will be liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered.
(Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.3d 761, 763 (Idaho, 2007),
citing State v. Hart, 142 Idaho 721, 723, 132 P.3d 1249, 1251 (2006).
(Other internal cites omitted».
4.

The Court Applies the "Best Interest" Standard in Review of the Magistrate's

The Court, in its review of the magistrate decision, conducts an analysis as to
whether the court appropriately kept the best interest of the children as its paramount
concern. Roberts illustrates this standard:
Further, in any court decision affecting children, the best
interests of the child should be the primary consideration.
(Roberts, at 403- 404, citing Cope v. Cope, 98 Idaho 920,921,576 P.2d
201,202 (1978».
Further, "[f]indings pertaining to custody are relevant so long as they bear an
appropriate nexus to the best interests of the child standard." (ld., at 405, citing Roeh v.

Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 558, 746 P.2d 1016, 1018).
5.

Case Law Defines "Competent Findings."

The reviewing Court will not disturb the magistrate holding below if it is supported
by competent evidence:
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Findings are competent, so long as they are supported by
substantial, albeit possibly conflicting, evidence. (Id.,
citing Lickley v Max Herbold, Inc., 133 Idaho 209, 2011, 984
P.2d 697, 699 (1999».
6.

The Magistrate Must Make Findings Pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-717.

There is no abuse of discretion if the court below acts consistently with the law
applicable to

t.~e

case at bar. In rev;ew of a custody award, this Court must thus hold that

the magistrate properly conducted a

I.e. § 32-717 analysis.

(Id., at 406).

I.e. § 32-717 outlines the non-exhaustive factors that the magistrate Court correctly
applies regarding a decision in the best interest of the children:
32-717. Custody of children - Best interest. - (1) In
an action for divorce the court may, before and after
judgment, give such direction for the custody, care and
education of the children of the marriage as may seem
necessary or proper in the best interests of the children.
The court shall consider all relevant factors which may
include:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his
or her custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to her or her custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child
with his or her parent or parents, and his or her siblings;
(d) The child's adjustment to his or her home, school and
community;
(e) The character and circumstances of all individuals
involved;
(f) The need to promote continuity and stability in the
life of the child; and
(g) Domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303,
Idaho Code, whether or not in the presence of the child.
(Idaho Code § 32-717).
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7.

The Magistrate May Also Properly Consider Other Factors Outside Idaho

Code § 32-717.
A court may also consider factors not outlined in Idaho Code § 32-717 in its analysis
of the best interest of the child, including whether relocation is in the best interests of the
child(ren). "Courts may consider factors not enumerated in § 32-717 when deciding
whether to permit a relocation." (Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 197 P.3d 310,316 (Idaho
2008), citing Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho at 405,64 P. 3d at 331».
In Bartosz, this Court affirmed the magistrate's holding that it was not in the best
interest of the minor child for her to relocate with her mother to Hawaii. Although the
custody evaluator in Bartosz recommended the move, the magistrate, after conducting a
§32-717 analysis, as well as an analysis of the Roberts "other factors," discussed infra,
declined to allow the move. This Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the
magistrate's holding.

Roberts v. Roberts involved a permissive appeal to this Court wherein there was an
appeal from the magistrate's decision prohibiting the mother's move to Boise, Idaho (from
Cassia and/or Minidoka County). In Roberts, the magistrate conducted an analysis of the

§ 32-717 factors, as well as other factors used by California and New York courts to
determine whether the relocation was in the best interest of the children. (Roberts, at 405).
These factors consist of the following: (1) The extent of the child's contact with his or her
parents; (2) the parents' motives for relocating or opposing relocation; (3) the impact the
move would have on the child's relationship with a noncustodial parent and extended
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family, and (4) the extent the move would enhance the economic, emotional and
educational well-being of the custodial parent and the child. (Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho
449, 197 P.3d 310,316 (Idaho 2008».
8.

There is no Presumption Against Relocation in Idaho Law.

This Court has previously ruled that, upon a modification from an existing custody

order, the party seeking permission to relocate has the burden to show relocation is in the
children's best interest. (See, Roberts, at 405). However, Idaho law does not impose a
presumption against relocation per se, but instead looks to ensure that both parties have
frequent and continuing contact with their child(ren):
As this Court held in Bartosz:

Idaho law does not impose a presumption against

relocation .. An award ofjoint physical custody must assure
that the child has frequent and continuing contact
with both parents' but this (does not necessarily mean the
child's time with each parent should be exactly the same in
length nor does it necessarily mean the child should be
alternating back and forth over certain period of times
between each parent.' (I.C. § 37-7-717(B». (Bartosz, 197 P.3d 310,317, citing
Roberts, 138 Idaho at 404 (other internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added».
Further, when the magistrate awards joint physical custody, this does not mean a
party cannot relocate:

.... The presumption in favor ofjoint custody is not
equivalent to a presumption against a custodial parent
relocating with a child. As discussed above, the best interest
of the child standard governs relocation decisions. (Id.)(emphasis added).
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9.

The Magistrate Court is not Bound by Expert Testimony; Thus it is not an

Abuse of Discretion When the Magistrate Declines to Follow the Recommendations of the
Custody Evaluation.
"The determination of whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact 'lies
within the broad discretion of the trial court.'" (Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc.,

150 Idaho 240, 245 P.3d 992, 1004 (Idaho 2010), citing Sliman v Aluminum Co., ofAmerica,
112 Idaho 277, 285, 731 P.2d 1267,1275 (1986».
Numerous Idaho custody cases reflect the decision of the magistrate, as part of its
"best interest" analysis, to decline to follow the recommendation of the custody evaluator.
For example, in McGriff v. McGriff, 140 Idaho 642, 99 P.3d 111 (2004), the custody evaluator,
Dr. Corgiat, recommended that custody and visitation of the parties' two daughters not be
altered. (McGriff, 140 Idaho at 644). The magistrate substantially altered the father's
parenting time; said finding was not disturbed on appeal. (Id., at 654).
Further, in Bartosz, the home study evaluation recommended that the mother be
allowed to move with the child to Hawaii. (Bartosz, at 314). This Court affirmed the
magistrate's holding was in the best interest of the child to remain in Idaho. (Id).
10.

The Magistrate's Decision to Follow All, Part, or None of a Custody

Evaluator's Recommendation is Part of the Three -Part Discretion Analysis.
The three-part test of discretion lies when determining whether or not expert
testimony has been subject to a purported abuse of discretion:
In determining whether the district court has abused its
discretion, this Court must determine whether the district
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court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of that discretion consistent
with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision
through the exercise of reason. (Kuhn,245 P.3d 992, 1004)
(Internal citation(s) omitted).
11.

Idaho Code § 32-717B Encompasses the Issue of Sole vs. Joint Custody.

I.C. § 32-717B encompasses the definition of joint custody vs. sole custody:
32-717B. Joint custody. - (1) 'Joint custody' means
an order awarding custody of the minor child or children
to both parents and providing that physical custody shall
be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the
child or children of frequent and continuing contact with
both parents. The court may award either joint physical

custody or joint legal custody or both as between the parents
or parties as the court determines is for the best interests of
the minor child or children. If the court declines to enter an
order awarding joint custody, the court shall state in its
decision the reasons for denial of an award of joint custody.
(2) 'Joint physical custody' means an order awarding each
of the parents significant periods of time in which a child
resides with or is under the care and supervision of each of
the parents or parties.

Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such
a way to assure the child a frequent and continuing contact
with both parents but does not necessarily mean the child's
time with each parent should be exactly the same in length
nor does it necessarily mean the child should be alternating back
and forth over certain periods of time between each parent.
The actual amount of time with each parent shall be determined
by the court.
(3) 'Joint legal custody' means a judicial determination that
the parents or parties are required to share the decision-making
rights, responsibilities and authority relating to the health,
education and general welfare of a child or children.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (5), of this section, absent
a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, there shall be a
presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor
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child or children. (Idaho Code § 32-717B)(emphasis added).
IV. ARGUMENT
1.

SUMMARY

Respondent will demonstrate herein that the magistrate did not abuse its discretion
in its custody order. The magistrate recognized the issue as one of discretion. The
magistrate conducted a thoughtful and thorough analysis of I.e. § 32-717 to determine a
custody order in the best interest of the Peterson children.

In addition, the magistrate

considered and made findings pursuant to the supplemental factors regarding best interest
found in Roberts and Bartosz. The magistrate made its decision based upon an exercise of
reason and analysis of the evidence offered at trial.
In addition, Respondent will show that the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in
declining to order the custody recommended in the evaluation. Respondent will further
demonstrate that the court was not required to order equal physical custody; but instead
correctly followed § 32-717B in fashioning an order that assured both parties frequent and
continuous contact with the children.
Finally, Respondent will show that the magistrate acted within its discretion by
allowing Respondent to move to Utah with the children. The magistrate correctly
determined that said move is in the best interest of the children by its application of an
extensive § 32-717 and "other factors" analysis.
A.

THE MAGISTRATE DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN

AWARDING PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY TO RESPONDENT.
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1.

The Magistrate Recognized that the Issue of Custody was one of Discretion.

The magistrate made conclusions of law regarding the discretionary nature of the
award of custody of the Peterson children:
1. Questions of child custody are within the discretion of the trial court.

Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977). (R., Vol. 2, p. 389).
2.

The Magistrate Acted Within the Outer Limits of its Discretion and

Consistently With the Legal Standards Applicable to the Available Choices.
The magistrate, in its Memorandum Decision, conducted a thorough analysis of all
factors contained in Idaho Code § 32-717 "best interest" standard. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 384-388).
In addition, the magistrate completed competent findings regarding the children, using
the supplemental factors outlined in Roberts.

Regarding the Roberts factors, the

magistrate's findings and conclusions encompassed its analysis of (1) The impact moving
the children would have on the children's non-custodial parent and extended family; (2)
The extent a move to Utah would enhance the economic, emotional and educational wellbeing of the custodial parent and children, and (3) the effect a move to Utah would have
on the children's relationship with their extended family.

(R., Vol. 2, p. 389).

In

consideration of these factors, the court found the following:
(1) Regarding the impact of a move on Appellant:

The magistrate made

findings that (a) upon entry of the divorce, the parties will no longer be
residing together, and, of necessity, time with one or both parents will be
reduced; (b) the parties had previously experienced exchanging the
children in Malad, Idaho, and (c) the relocation of Respondent to Utah
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would not hinder Appellant's alternate weekend, alternate holiday, and
half-summer parenting time allocated to Appellant. (R., Vol. 2, p. 389).
Further, the custody order is nearly identical to the temporary orders, with the
exception of weekday parenting time. (R. Vol. 1, p. 205).
(2) Regarding the extent the move to Utah would enhance the economic,
emotional, and educational well-being of the children and Respondent:
The magistrate made findings as follows:

(a) Respondent and the

children would live rent free in the paternal grandfather's home (R., Vol. 2,
p. 389); (b) Respondent could continue to be a stay-at-home mother, while
at the same time working part-time for her brother (R. Vol. 2, p. 389); (c)
the emotional support available from Respondent's extended family (and
the lack of the same in Idaho) was significant (R., Vol 2, p. 389); and (d)
the educational opportunities available to Respondent to better herself
and the children financially in Utah was in the best interest of the children

(R., Vol. 2, p. 389).
(3) Regarding the effect a move would have on the children's relationship
with their extended family: The magistrate made the following findings:
the Utah move would allow the children to have access to Respondent's
family, and Appellant's family would have access to the children during
his parenting time (R., Vol. 2, p. 389).
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3.

The Magistrate Reached its Decision Regarding Custody Through an

Exercise of Reason.

Roberts defines the test for "exercise of reason." The Roberts magistrate "acted
within his discretion by considering factors relevant to the best interests of the child analysis
and his findings support his ultimate decision, demonstrating the decision was reached by
an act of reason." (Roberts, at 404).
The magistrate in the instant case also reached his findings by act of reason. The
magistrate, "considered the testimony and demeanor of the parties and witnesses, the
evidence and the arguments/briefs of the parties." (R., Vol. 2, p. 379).

The magistrate

conducted an extensive analysis, applying the evidence at trial to the § 32-717 factors and
the Roberts factors. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 384-389). The findings made by the magistrate clearly
support its ultimate decision to award joint legal and joint physical custody of the children
to the parties, with primary physical custody in Respondent and secondary custody in
Appellant.
B.

THE MAGISTRATE GAVE APPROPRIATE WEIGHT TO THE

CUSTODY EVALUATION IN THIS CASE.
The magistrate had the discretion to give weight to the custody evaluation as it
deemed appropriate as part of its analysis of the best interest of the children, as discussed in

Kuhn herein. The magistrate utilized the evaluation as one part of the evidence presented
at trial, and incorporated the evaluation extensively in its analysis and discussion of the § 32717 and Roberts factors.
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Appellant attempts to argue that the magistrate abused its discretion because it
"largely ignored Dr. Walker's Comprehensive Custody Evaluation." (Appellant's Brief, p.
18). Appellant attempts to claim that the magistrate abused its discretion because it did not
award 50/50 custody:
The magistrate disregarded Dr. Walker's recommendations
of joint physical custody with a parenting plan allowing the
children equal time with both parents. (Appellant's Brief, p.l8).
Idaho Code § 32-717B and case law dictate that the magistrate was not required to
award equal custody to the parties, but rather to ensure that the custody order assures that
both parents have frequent and continuing contact.

Bartosz held that "frequent and

continuing" does not mean 50/50: "this [frequent and continuing] 'does not necessarily
mean the child's time with each parent should be exactly the same in length nor does it
mean the child should be alternating back and for the over certain period of times between
each parent.'" (Bartosz, at 317). In addition, contrary to Appellant's assertion, the
magistrate was not required to make findings, pursuant to § 32-717B, outlining the reasons
why it declined to award "joint custody." The "decline" of "joint custody" outlined in §32717B encompasses a denial of joint custody via ordering sole custody to one party, and thus
is not applicable to the instant case.
Appellant further attempts to argue that the magistrate abused its discretion in
awarding primary physical custody to Respondent because it gave "limited" visitation to
Appellant. In fact, the magistrate awarded Appellant every other weekend, equal sharing of
holidays and parenting time each summer, essentially the same as its Temporary Orders.
As evidenced by the extensive findings of fact, and the application of the evidence at trial to
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the appropriate legal standard, the magistrate found that the custody it awarded was in the
best interest of the children.
Appellant also attempts to claim that the custody order is inappropriate, in that the
magistrate did not award him two evenings during each week. (Appellant's Brief, p. 17).
The magistrate did not abuse its discretion in declining to order two evenings each week to
Appellant, given the problematic nature of exchanging the children for an evening in Malad,
Idaho. As stated herein, the magistrate, as part of its analysis regarding the best interest of
the children, held that it was in their best interest to be allowed to move to Utah with
Respondent.
Appellant goes on to claim that the magistrate abused its discretion because of the
number of times the report was mentioned:
The magistrate mentioned Dr. Walker's report merely four
times in his Memorandum Decision. He reviewed: 1) Dr. Walker's
report pertaining to the children's wishes to remain in Idaho;
2) the report's reference to the children's attachment to Laura;
3) the report's reference to Russell's activity with the children; and
4) Russell's agreement to the report's recitation of Laura's strengths.
No other mention was made of Dr. Walker's opinion or her
recommended parenting plan. (Appellant's Brief, p. 18-19).

The magistrate, as evidenced by its findings, gave the appropriate attention and
weight to the custody evaluation in that it discussed, evaluated and weighed the custody
evaluation as part of its detailed "best interest" analysis.
Some examples of the magistrate conducting a reasoned analysis with respect to the
recommendations of the evaluation include:
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(a)

The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his
or her custody:

Plaintiff wishes to have legal and physical custody awarded
to the parties jointly with the children being with plaintiff
for two (2) overnights per week and alternating weekends from
Friday until Monday morning when plaintiff would take the
children to schooL The children would be with the defendant at
all other times. The plaintiff does not want the plaintiff to be
permitted to move more than twenty (20) miles from Rigby.
Although he does not now agree to do so, the plaintiff has previously
told the defendant that he would move to Utah if she moved there
with the children. (R., Vol. 2, p. 384).
The magistrate discussed and weighed the custody evaluation as part of its analysis
regarding Idaho Code § 32-717(b):
(b)

The 'wishes of the child as to his or her custodian:

According to the report (plaintiffs Exhibit 1) of Ruby Walker
(custody evaluator), the children prefer to remain in their current
schools with friends, their church, and activities in the Rigby area.
The plaintiff testified that he has heard the children, on June 12,
2011, speak about their desires and has heard nothing to suggest
the children feel differently than set forth in Ruby Walker's report.
The defendant testified that she has heard the children say things
different from that which is set forth in Ruby Walker's report.
The court did not hear from the children, indirectly. The court is
unclear regarding the children's current desires.
(R.,VoL 2, p. 385).
1.

The Magistrate Appropriately Revi.ewed and Weighed Dr. Walker's Report

Regarding Appellant's "Strengths".
Appellant attempts to argue that the magistrate committed error in that it did not
take into account Appellant's "strengths:"
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Dr. Walker's report noted numerous positive, confirming findings
that Russell is a good, involved father, which were not mentioned
in the magistrate's findings and decision. (Appellant's Brief, p. 20).
The magistrate, by contrast, in fact made extensive findings, including an
analysis of the evaluation, regarding Appellant's "strengths":
The children get along well with each other and the children
interact well with both parents. The court finds, as set forth in
Ruby Walker's Report: 'The emotional attachment is strong with
all the children and their mother, Laura. She has been the primary
caregiver and is very close to all the children. Particularly, E and G
demonstrate a primary attachment with their mother, Laura. As W
ages, he and Russell do more camping and outdoor adventures and
will continue to become more attached to Russell. T is attached to
both. He loves to go with dad and do activities with him. The twins
are obviously more attached to Laura at this time due to her primary
care. They played primarily with the older children, especially E and G.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 385-386).
The magistrate made further findings regarding Appellant's strengths, quoting from
the evaluators report, and the disputed testimony of the parties:
Further, the court finds, as set forth by Ruby Walker: 'Russell does interact
with the children when he is home and on the weekends when they do
camping, hiking or interacting at home.
He did take one month off when the twins were born and helped
in their care.'
Since the plaintiffs arrest and filing of this divorce, he has spent
more time with the children than he did before. (R., Vol. 2, p. 386).

It is clear from the findings in this mattcr that the magistrate arrived at
its order regarding custody by applying the applicable legal standard and by way of reason,
evaluating the the totality of the evidence, including the custody evaluation.
In summary, the magistrate did not abuse its discretion by declining to enter a
custody order in accordance with the custody evaluators recommendation. The magistrate
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was not obligated to follow the recommendations of the evaluator. The magistrate instead
conducted a thoughtful and thorough analysis of all of the testimony and evidence offered at
the three (3) day trial, including the evaluation.

The magistrate found, by act of reason,

that it was in the best interest of the minor children that they be placed in Respondent's
primary care, and allowed to move to Utah with Respondent. This holding was reached
after an analysis of the factors of I.C. § 32-717 and L'le supplemental factors of Roberts and

Bartosz. Because the court found that it was in the best interest of the minor children that
Respondent be awarded primaly physical custody and be allowed to move to Utah, the
magistrate could not have entered the parenting plan recommended by Dr. Walker, which
included almost half-time, including evenings during the week.
Finally, Appellant is correct:
Russell does not argue that a magistrate must adopt
the findings and recommendations of a court-appointed
custody evaluator as a matter of law.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 23).
2.

"Overwhelming Evidence" Does not Exist, Requiring the Magistrate to

Adopt the Evaluator's Proposed Custody.
Appellant asserts that the magistrate should have adopted the recommendations of
the custody evaluator, because there is "overwhelming evidence that it should be entered."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 26).
By contrast, there is substantial evidence in the record that demonstrate the
magistrate's custody order is in the best interest of the children.
Some examples of the evidence presented at trial as follows:
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A. Respondent is Primary Caregiver:
Laura's strengths as a mother are: she is willing
to stay home with the children; is often very caring and warm
with the children; children are attached to her; and overall she
has been a good mother. (R., Vol. 2, p. 287).
B. Appellant's Loss of His Employment due to his Conduct:
Q:

A:

.... this came on the heels of your being terminated for your
employment attendant with some criminal charges that
have been filed against you; correct?
That's true. (Tr., p. 49, 11. 7-11).

And:
C. Appellant's Time Spent with the Children:
The magistrate made findings regarding Appellant's time with the children:
Since the plaintiffs arrest and filing of this divorce,
he has spent more time with the children than he did before.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 386).
While the amount of time plaintiff spent with the children was in dispute at trial, the
integrity of said findings should not be disturbed if said findings are made on the basis of
disputed evidence. (See, Hopper v. Hopper, 167 P.3d 761, 763).
D. Conflict.
The record contains, and the magistrate made substantial findings, regarding the
substantial evidence of conflict between the parties:
First, Appellant revealed, without consent from Respondent, her confidences
revealed to Appellant. Appellant betrayed the trust of his wife by traveling to Utah, at the
end of the 2010, for the purpose of meeting with Respondent's father to tell him
Respondent's confidential information. (Tr., p. 115,11.2-25- p. 116,11. 1-14).
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In Appellant's words:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:

Were you in court when Mr. Knight, your father-in-law, was
testifying?
Yes.
And he was asked questions about a conversation that you had had
with him; were you here for that?
Yes.
Was the context of that conversation, that was the past abuseI'm using it in quotes, but is that the context of part of the
conversation you had with Mr. Knight as he described it?
Yes.

Q: You broke her confidence by telling her father about that subject,
right?
A: Yes. (Tr., p. 171,11.25- p. 172,1. 10); (Tr., p. 173,11.2-4).
Second, Appellant took and copied Respondent's and their daughter's journals,
without their permission. (Tr., p. 280, 11 24-25 - p. 281, 11. 1-15); (Tr., p. 287, 11. 12-25; p. 288,
11. 1-19); (Tr., p. 362, 1. 18- p. 364, 1. 18).
Appellant reveals his reasons for copying E's journal:
E is ... very private and so she doesn't volunteer information,
and given the magnitude of her turmoil over this as disclosed
in her journals, yes, I thought that was very appropriate and
needful for me as her parent to have some insight into what
was going on. (Tr. p. 275, 11. 1-8 and 11. 18-23).
Appellant, himself, reveals his thought process, in that he tries to justify the
invasion of the daughter's privacy by what he found out in her journals.
Third, (as the magistrate found), by previous temporary court order, the plaintiffwas
ordered to remove himself from the family home ... The plaintiff then placed an RV (in
which he resided) next to the house ... After a few weeks, the plaintiff resumed residing in
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the family home. (fhe parties have disperate explanations on how this came to be). (R.,

Vol. 2, p. 387).
Fourth, Appellant filed the divorce in retaliation for Respondent wanting to leave
town with the children. (fr., p. 47, 11. 22-25; p. 48, 11. 1-6).
Fifth, Appellant acknowledged the stress in the marriage. (fr., p. 59, 11. 12-15);
Appellant attributed the stress in the marriage to his "same-sex attraction", and stated that
his "same sex attraction" is stressful only because Respondent dwelled on it. (fr., p. 59, 11.

21-25- p. 60, 11. 1-2). Respondent testified that Appellant's "same sex attraction" was the
source of great conflict in the marriage. (fr., p. 378, L 1- p. 381, 1. 20).
Sixth, Appellant did not involve Respondent in the financial aspects of their
marriage. He didn't inform her of the significant tax refund proceeds which he spent
without her knowledge or consent. (fr., p. 614, 11. 4-25; p. 615, 11. 1-14). He closed a credit
card to which Respondent had previously had routine access, without telling her. (fr., p.

139-,11.17-25- p. 140,11. 8). Appellant transferred a large amount of cash out of a bank
account routinely used by Respondent, without telling her. (fr., p. 140, 11. 9-25- p. 141, 11.1-

23).
Seventh, Respondent testified that she felt like Appellant wore her down and that
she did not want to reconcile, but felt that she "gave up" and entered into a sexual
relationship with him for a couple of weeks. (fr., p. 385, 11. 10-25; p. 386, 11. 1-3); (fr., p.

175,11. 16-25).
Eighth, as of the time of trial, the parties were not speaking or communicating at all
while in the home. (fr., p. 176,11. 1-25); (fr., p. 402,11. 13-25).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

23

The magistrate summarized the evidence of conflict in its findings:
The parties have not spoken to each other for much of the
time since the plaintiff resumed residing of the home.
Substantial conflict exists between the parties and the parties
are experiencing considerable stress. (R., Vol. 2, p. 387).

Ninth, there is further substantial testimony that Appellant consistently made
choices in direct contradiction to the best interests of the children. For example, he let the
home telephone be terminated on at least one occasion. (fr., p. 150, 11. 16-25; p. 151, 11. 8-10).
Tenth, according to Respondent's testimony, Appellant's actions had caused a rift
in the community where Respondent and the children reside, including but not limited to,
the children's parties, social activities, school functions, the fact that neighborhood children
do not come over to play, and that Appellant was excommunicated from his church. (fr., p.
399,1. 6- p. 402, 1. 12).
C.

APPELLANT IS MISPLACED IN HIS CLAIM THAT RESPONDENT

MUST REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF JOINT CUSTODY.
Appellant attempts to discuss a purported duty of Respondent to overcome the
"favor of joint custody". Appellant is misplaced in his reliance on Idaho Code § 32-717B in
this regard, as Idaho Code § 32-717B deals with joint custody vs. sole custody, and does not
hold that "frequent and substantial contact" equals "equal parenting time".
The magistrate, in fact, awarded joint legal custody to the parties:
It is in the best interest of the minor children of the parties,
that the parties be awarded the joint legal custody of the minor
children. (R., Vol. 2, p. 391).
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Further, the magistrate advised:

It is in the best interest of the minor children of the parties
that the parties be awarded the joint physical custody of the
children, with primary physical custody being awarded to the
defendant, subject to the right of the plaintiff to exercise secondary
physical custody with the children ... (R.,Vol. 2, p. 391).
Respondent was not required to rebut any presumption of "joint custody" in this
case. The parties each requested joint legal and joint custody, and the magistrate granted
joint legal and joint custody. Respondent prayed for primary physical custody, Appellant
merely prayed for joint legal and joint physical custody.
Simply because the custody evaluation recommended substantially equal physical
custody, it does not follow that Respondent has a duty to rebut this proposition. Further, as
discussed herein, the magistrate entered its order for custody based upon the totality of the
evidence, including the custody evaluation.
D.

THE MAGISTRATE DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS I.C. §

32-717(e) CHARACTER FINDINGS.
Appellant claims that the magistrate abused its discretion in that it purportedly made
improper character findings pursuant to I.C. § 32-717(e). By contrast, substantial evidence
and testimony was submitted at trial regarding the character of the parties, including, but
not limited to, the conflict between the parties.
As recounted in Appellant' Brief, Respondent offered testimony as to her concerns

about joint custody:

Q.

Do you feel that that the two of you can effectively co-parent
your children, communicate and co-parent your children as
outlined per [Dr. Walker's] evaluation ... ?
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A.
Q.
A.

No.
And why not?
Well, you'd have to be able to talk, first of all, and not argue .....
He does not respect me, I do not respect him. There is nothing
there except for-it's just-just misery (fr. p. 414, L. 6-18).
(emphasis added) (Appellant's Brief, p. 26-27).

Appellant claims the court made inappropriate findings regarding the issue of
Appellant, disclosing without permission of Respondent, her "secret", to her father, and that
the court made an inappropriate finding regarding Appellant's taking, without permission,
the oldest daughter's diary.
The magistrate, by contrast, (as discussed supra), found the revelation of said
"secret" and the taking of the daughter's diary without her permission important. This
conduct could very reasonably reveal information about: (1) Appellant's character; (2) his
interaction and the conflict between the parties; and/or, (3) his treatment of the children.
Needless to say, the parties are in dispute with respect to these and other issues.
However, pursuant to case law, the findings of the court will not be disturbed even if the
evidence related to said findings is in dispute. (See, Hopper v. Hopper, 167 P. 3d 761, 763).
The magistrate made competent findings, supported by substantial evidence,
regarding the § 32-717(e) factors. The magistrate, with respect to character of the parties,
found the following:
She [Respondent] was abused by one of her brothers as a
young girl Defendant shared this information
plaintiff in confidence, and he then, without the
knowledge of and without authorization, disclosed this
information to defendant's father. Defendant's father had not
previously been aware of this. The defendant has been in
counseling since April, 2010. (R., Vol. 2, p. 387).
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Further, the magistrate made findings regarding Appellant's taking, without
permission, Respondent's and the daughter's journal:
During earlier divorce proceedings between the parties
(2002-2003), the plaintiff, without authorization,
copies portions of the defendant's journal. ...
In August or September, 2009, the plaintiff also copied
and read the journal of the parties' child, E. This was done

without the authorization or the prior knowledge of E.
In approximately, April, 2010, plaintiff [Appellant] told
E that he had read her journal. E has not kept a journal since
plaintiff [Appellant1 told her that he had read her journal. The

impact upon E of the plaintiffs [Appellant's] violation of her
privacy in relation to her journal is of concern to the court.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 387) (emphasis added).

Appellant's Brief further discusses information about character, and apparently
reveals Appellant's motive for the unauthorized disclosure (of Respondent's confidence):
Q.

A.

Okay. You had not talked to him [Respondent's father]
previously about this [the abuse issue], correct?
No. I'd always honored her confidence until she was

trying to move the children down closer to this toxic influence
that's never been dealt with. (Tr. p. 257, L. 1-15)
(emphasis added).

As previously stated, the parties' high conflict was evident and obvious to the
magistrate:
Substantial conflict exists between the parties and the parties are
experiencing considerable stress. (R., Vol. 2, p. 387).
In fact, the evidence of the conflict between the parties, and the court's concerns
regarding the same, is replete through the magistrate's findings:

1.

Although he does not agree to do so, plaintiff has previously
told defendant he would move to Utah if she moved there with
the children. (R., Vol. 2, p. 384).
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2.

The plaintiff has struggled with the same-sex attraction
since prior to the marriage to the parties. This has
caused conflict in the marriage from the beginning, at times
being more serious, than others. In June, 2009, the plaintiff
was arrested and charged with indecent exposure, in
associating with his solicitation of an off-duty male police
officer....This has caused the defendant great concern as
to the impact this will have, and, in her perspective, has
had, on associations by others with family members.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 386).

3.

The defendant has not kept a journal since then.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 387).

E.

THE MAGISTRATE ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN

ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO RELOCATE WITH THE CHILDREN TO UTAH.
The magistrate acted within its discretion holding that it is in the best interest of the
minor children that they be allowed to move to Utah with Respondent.
As discussed herein, Appellant attempts to claim that the magistrate ignored the

custody recommendation against Respondent moving with the children. In fact, the
magistrate acted within its discretion, made findings in accordance with the applicable law,
and made its findings by act of reason.
The magistrate, as discussed herein, analyzed the wishes of the parents and the
children as to the custody of the children, as required by § 32-717(a) and (b).
The magistrate also conducted an analysis and made substantial findings regarding
I.C. § 32-717 (c) , the interaction in a relationship of the children with his or her parent or
parent(s) and his or her siblings. In fact, the magistrate quoted from the custody evaluation
as part of its findings in this regard. The magistrate found that Respondent is the primary
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caregiver in terms of time and Appellant did interact with the children. More telling, the
amount of time Appellant spent with the children increased after the filing of the divorce
and Appellant's arrest.
The magistrate found that the children were well-adjusted to home, school, and
community as applicable to their ages, pursuant to its analysis of the requirements of I.e. §
32-717 (d).
As described supra, the magistrate conducted a thorough and appropriate analysis of

the "character" element of

I.e. § 32-717(e).

The court made substantial findings regarding

the conflict of the parties, Appellant's same-sex attraction and the resulting problems and
conflict in the marriage, Respondent's emotional issues, the revelation of Respondent's
confidence to her father, as well as the unauthorized printing and reading of Respondent's
and minor child's journal; these issues and more were all of significance to the magistrate
and formed an integral part of its reasoning regarding the order for custody.
Further, from the testimony and evidence submitted to the court, the court found
that financially neither party could afford to maintain the home after the divorce, and that
while Respondent would not have financial resources should she stay in the Rigby, Idaho
area, she could "be a stay at home mother" (while earning income, mostly in the home)

should she move to Utah. (R., Vol. 2, p. 388).
In fact, substantial evidence was offered by Respondent uncontroverted by
Appellant, regarding the better financial environment for the children in Utah:
Respondent's brother testified that he will employ Respondent part-time, allowing
her to continue to be a stay-at-home mother. (Tr., p. 104,11. 14-25 - p. 105, 11. 1-24).
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Respondent's father testified that Respondent and the children will live with him in
his home in the Salt Lake City area. (fr., p. 109, 11. 15-25).
Respondent's father testified that he will provide for Respondent's and the children's
needs. (fr., p. 110,11. 3-11).
The magistrate, in its discussion ofl.C. § 32-717(£), found (regarding continuity and
stability in the life of the children), that while continuity and stability were important in the
lives of the children, they had in fact moved multiple times:
Continuity and stability are important in the lives of the
children. The family has lived, however, in South Carolina
(1995-1998), Provo, Utah (1998-1999), Shelley, Idaho (1999.2004),
and Rigby, Idaho (2004 to present). (R., Vol. 2, p. 388).
The magistrate appropriately found that, as part of the substantial findings, that any
domestic violence, as outlined in I.C. § 32-7-717(g) was not applicable.
The magistrate made additional findings regarding the best interest of the children.

As discussed herein, the magistrate applied the facts of this case to the following: 1) The
impact moving the children would have on the children's relationship with a non-custodial
parent and extended family; 2) the extent a move to Utah would enhance the economic,
emotional and educational well being of the custody parent and children; and, 3) the effect
that a move to Utah would have on t..l].e children's relationship ",ith their extended family.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 389).
The magistrate, in its analysis of the impact moving the children would have on the
children's relationship with a non-custodial parent and extended family, pointed out the
obvious, in that, although Appellant seems to argue to the contrary, that the parties will not
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be living at the same residence after the divorce:
At the conclusion of this divorce action, the parents will
not be residing in the same residence. Accordingly, the
time spent by one or both of the parents with the children
will, of necessity, be reduced.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 389).

Further, the magistrate found that the parties had prior experience with exchanging
the children in Malad.
•.. the parties have preciously worked out visitation
arrangements during their earlier (2002-2003) divorce
proceedings wherein they exchanged the children in
Malad, Idaho (at Burger King). (R., Vol. 2, p. 389).
Additionally, the magistrate made findings that Appellant will have the children for
substantial periods of time:
A non-relocating parent could have the children with
him/her on weekends, holidays, on other important days
during summers. (R., Vol. 2, p. 389).
The magistrate also made extensive findings regarding the best interest of the
children economically should a move take occur:
If defendant were to move to Utah with the children,
would enhance defendant's economic situation, in
light of the fact that she and the children could
live rent free in defendant's father home. Defendant
could essentially be a stay-at-home mother with the children,
while earning income in her home, by performing
secretarial services for her brother. The defendant could
eventually pursue her educational pursuits in the ultrasound
field in Utah. In Utah, the defendant and children would
have emotional support from extended family.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 389).
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In summary, by applying the appropriate legal standards and making its
findings by way of reason, the magistrate found that it is in the best interests of the minor
children that they be allowed to move to Utah with Respondent.
F.

THE MAGISTRATE ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION REGARDING

APPELLANT'S "DRASTIC CHANGE" ARGUMENT.
Appellant attempts to argue t.hat the magistrate abused its discretion regarding t..lte
custody order, in that the evaluator claimed: "[to1 change this [Appellant's time with the
children] in any drastic manner will have a detrimental effect upon the children."
(Appellant's Brief p. 36).
As discussed by the magistrate, both parties may have daily contact with the

children when they are in the course of a marriage and living in the same family home.
This, of necessity, must change with children of divorce. (R., Vol. 2, p. 389). Respondent
does not believe that Appellant urges this Court to have the parties continue to reside
together after divorce.
The magistrate was correct in the finding, after divorce, of necessity, one parent is
going to have less time then he or she would during the pendency of a marriage. (R. Vol., 2,
pg.389).
The assertion of "drastic change" is simply unfounded, and not supported in the
report. The evaluation report gave no information as to any effect on the lesser time that
Appellant would have on the children. The magistrate appropriately gave weight to the
entirety of the custody report, including but not limited to, the unsupported that a change in
"any drastic manner will have a detrimental effect upon the children."
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Indeed, given Appellant's assertions in this regard, it would appear that he would
urge this Court to hold that a magistrate can never enter any custody order other than 50/50
physical custody. If this Court were to follow Appellant's reasoning, than no court would
ever be acting in the best interest of children if one parent was awarded alternate weekends,
summers and alternate holidays.
G.

THE MAGISTRATE ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION REGARDING

THE CHILDREN'S FRIENDS AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES.
Although Appellant would urge this Court to find that the magistrate made false
findings regarding the children's friends and social activities, the court indeed made
findings regarding the children's interaction with friends and social activities:
The children are well adjusted to their home, school
(as applicable) and community (as applicable to their ages).
(R., Vol. 2, p. 386).
This was one of the elements thoroughly analyzed by the court in its findings of the
best interest of the children, as required by I.C. § 32-717, as discussed herein.
H.

APPELLANT IS INCORRECT IN HIS ASSERTION THAT

RESPONDENT LIVED IN UTAH PREVIOUSLY.
Appellant attempts to argue that because Respondent "never resided" in Utah, that
the magistrate's findings regarding the previous exchange of the children is invalid, or that
said finding was made in an abuse of discretion.
It is clear from testimony at trial, the parties had exchanged the children in Utah.

(See Tr. pp. 496, 497, 498, 499).
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The magistrate's findings regarding the transportation issue never found that
Respondent lived in Utah. By contrast, the magistrate found the following:
... the parties have previously worked out visitation
arrangements during their earlier (2002-2003) divorce
proceedings wherein they exchanged the children in
Malad, Idaho (at Burger King). (R. Vol. 2, p. 389).

1.

THE MAGISTR.<\TE ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN ITS

FINDINGS REGARDING THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
AND RESPONDENT RELOCATING THE CHILDREN TO UTAH.
The magistrate reviewed and weighed the substantial evidence and testimony
regarding the economic benefit to the minor children and correctly ruled that the
Respondent should be allowed to relocate as discussed infra.
Regarding Respondent's purported financial needs, Appellant asserts that the
magistrate abused its discretion because there was no evidence regarding Respondent's
financial needs. (Appellant's Brief, p. 46). Respectfully, substantial testimony reflected that
all of her financial needs would be met between her father helping and working. Said needs
did not need to be outlined in the evidence and testimony presented.
Contrary to Appellant's assertion, Respondent does not have an affirmative duty to
"prove" that she would be on welfare if she stayed in the state of Idaho. The magistrate
weighed all of the evidence of the benefit to the minor children financially would she be able
to move. Further, as part of its analysis for the best interest of the children regarding
relocation to Utah, the magistrate was not required to find whether Respondent had
pursued or not pursued employment opportunities in Idaho.
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As discussed herein, the testimony was presented, uncontroverted, that the children
would be able to reside rent free in the home of the maternal grandfather. (fr. p. 100, ll. 35). Testimony was offered that the children had substantial relationship with their maternal
grandfather, uncles and had been to and stayed at their homes many times. (fr., p. 111, ll. 612); (fr., p. 373, 1. 25-p.375, 1.3). Respondent had employment opportunities available to her

and she would be able to work out of the home and be able to continue to be a stay-at-home
mother. (fr. p. 375, Il. 4-23) (R., Vol. 2, p. 389). Further, Respondent would be able to
pursue employment opportunities in the ultrasound field in Utah. (fr. p. 210, I. 19-p.213, l.
8).

The magistrate further weighed the issue that the oldest children, by nature of the
moves of the family, have been transient since birth; the parties moved four (4) times during
the pendency of the marriage. (R., Vol. 2, p. 388).
V. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Respondent respectfully submits that Appellant's Affidavits filed in support of his
Appeal, as well as any evidence or testimony involving Contempt hearing(s) previously
dismissed by the magistrate, are not part of the appeal herein and should not be considered

by this Court.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The magistrate in this case did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the parties have
joint legal and joint physical custody of their five children, with primary physical custody in
Respondent and secondary physical custody in Appellant. Nor did the magistrate abuse its
discretion in finding that it is in the best interests of the minor children that they be allowed
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to live in Utah with Respondent. The magistrate's findings support his ultimate ruling, as
required by Roberts.
The record in this case makes it clear that the magistrate recognized the issue of custody
as one of discretion. The magistrate made its findings by way of analysis of the applicable
law, § 32-717, and the Roberts "other factors."
There is no presumption against relocation in this case, and the magistrate correctly
made substantial findings that moving to Utah was one of the factors in the best interest of
the children.
Finally, and most importantly, the magistrate weighed all of the evidence presented at
trial, including the custody evaluation.

The magistrate was not required to follow the

custody evaluation. The findings of the magistrate are supported by substantial evidence, as
reflected in its thoughtful and thorough analysis of the "best interests" standards discussed
herein.
While some of the magistrate's findings may have been made pursuant to evidence
disputed by the parties, the magistrate's holding should not be disturbed, given the
competency of the findings.
In summary, as the magistrate acted within its discretion in its award of custody, and
for the reasons stated herein, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
magistrate's custody and visitation orders.
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